In our model Google attracts consumers with low valuations those less willing to pay to avoid disclosure. Microsoft attracts high valuation consumers. Which of these two strategies yields highest profits depends on how consumer valuations compare to disclosure revenues that is on how consumer willingness to pay compares to that of advertisers and on how firms interact in the marketplace. In the paper we provide a detailed characterization of the performance of both strategies.
Q Your work assumes there is transparency in the market with regard to the sharing of consumer information. Why is this key to a consumer s decision about which firms to Chinese Overseas America Number Data use A Yes this is a key ingredient of our analysis. As is the case in any market consumers need to be informed about products to make the right decisions. consumers need to be informed about the disclosure practices of firms in order to choose which services to patronize and how much information to provide them with. By focusing on the case of a transparent market our analysis provides a benchmark for how a well functioning market for consumer privacy should look like.
It is worth noting however that transparency in the market does not yield better consumer privacy per se. It has often been suggested that transparency together with competition will discipline the amount of consumer information disclosed in the marketplace. This view contends that lack of consumer privacy is a symptom of lack of transparency.